As the Government of Manitoba is anxious to examine its legislation in the near future, and has asked that our advice be submitted by December 31, 2001, I will have to base my advice on my own analysis of the legislation and the case law to which I have referred. It would of course be easier, and possibly more prudent, to wait and see what the Supreme Court says in the future, but that avenue is not open to me.

Issue No.1

The M. v. H. decision of the Supreme Court, that I discussed in Part I, has equal application to all property-related matters. It held that legislation can no longer distinguish between the rights of heterosexual common-law partners and same-sex common-law partners. Rights given to one must be given to the other.

The next and broader question is whether all common-law partners are entitled to the same rights as married partners. The answer to that question, I believe, can be discerned from an examination of the case law to which I have just referred. In my opinion, any and all Manitoba legislation that provides rights to married couples but withholds the same rights from common-law partners, would be held to be discriminatory and in contravention of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of the Canadian Constitution. Such provisions would be struck down and that would be the case whether the common-law couples are of the same or different sexes.

Gays, lesbians, same-sex common-law partners and opposite -sex common-law partners all fall within the prohibited categories if they are subject to differential treatment, as do individual men and women who live as husband and wife without being married. They have historically had stereotypical assumptions applied to them. They have been "marginalized, ignored and devalued" rather than being assessed for their individual abilities. The law has discriminated against them, either by applying limitations on their rights that are not applied to others, or by denying them similar rights. They can no longer be discriminated against and that means they must be treated in the same way and have the rights and benefits as married couples and other citizens.

Conversely, they and their relationships must be accorded the same rights and benefits as other individuals whether they are married or single. While it is quite proper to recognize and respect a marriage, a common-law partnership must be recognized and respected as well. As McLachlin J. said, "The question is whether the characteristic of being unmarried - not having contracted a marriage in a manner recognized by the state - constitutes a ground of discrimination within the ambit of s. 15(1). In my view it does."

It is my opinion that the Supreme Court, the next time it has a suitable case before it, will rule that, wherever possible, common-law partners be accorded the same rights as those provided to married partners.

Issue No. 2

The terms of reference asked us to recommend an approach for dealing with common-law partners' rights in legislation that now gives a person a right to inherit or share in their spouse's property. They specifically asked us to consider the methods applied in Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan.

Nova Scotia has taken a circuitous method of correcting, or trying to correct, its legislation that might be challenged under M. v. H. It amended its Vital Statistics Act by adding the term "domestic partner" and by providing certain rights attached to it. To qualify as a "domestic partner" common-law partners must file a declaration with the Registrar of Vital Statistics. Once that is done the partners become entitled to all the rights and obligations of a "spouse" under seventeen specified statutes.

There are problems with this approach. The spousal benefit only applies to common-law couples who choose to register. In my opinion they should be entitled to the same benefits whether they register or not. As there has not been a flood of applications to register a relationship to date, it can be assumed there must be thousands of unmarried couples who have not registered and do not share the benefits of a "spouse". Another problem is that not all statutes are covered by the amendments. It seems to me the possibility of a Charter challenge still exists.

The Nova Scotia case of Walsh v. Bona does not address this legislative change so it is impossible to say whether the Supreme Court, to which it has been appealed, will comment on the amendments or not. The Walsh case was decided on other grounds that may neutralize these legislative changes or make them ineffective, but it is impossible to say. I will have more to say on the registration system in Nova Scotia in the Part IV of this report.

Saskatchewan has decided to leave its statutes the way they were. It apparently believes that Saskatchewan courts will continue to define "spouse" to include a common-law partner. The judgment of Scheibel J. in Ferguson v. Armbrust, 187 D.L.R. 367, released on May 12, 2000 is, I assume, the authority for that position. In that case the parties had lived together for eleven years and had three children. When the man died, the woman brought an application for a declaration that she was the spouse of the deceased, entitled to administer his estate and to receive spousal benefits. The Intestate Succession Act as amended in 1999 provided that the children of a deceased would inherit the whole estate if there were no spouse. It did not mention common-law spouses and the children opposed the woman's application.

Justice Scheibel allowed the woman's application by interpreting the word "spouse" to include a common-law spouse, because of the functional similarities between spouses and common-law spouses. His alternative finding was that if common-law spouses are not included in the definition of "spouse", the applicant's right to equality based on the analogous ground of marital status that is guaranteed by the Charter, was infringed.

There is no similar case in Manitoba and as the Ferguson case is not binding or applicable in Manitoba, that procedure should not be followed. Another reason for not following that approach is that the terminology already used in Manitoba legislation forecloses that option.

Issue No. 3

There are a number of Manitoba statutes that would not withstand a Charter challenge based on discrimination and s. 15(1) of the Charter. The offending provisions will have to be altered or removed. At this point I will suggest the minimal changes that have to be made and in subsequent issues I will suggest more extensive amendments that I believe should be made.

First, I wish to say that the general approach taken by the government in Bill 41 is the best one to take. Including a definition of "common-law partner" and similar terms and adding them after "spouse" wherever it appears in any Act, will answer most of the shortcomings of the legislation.

There is however more work to be done, both in amending statutes that have not yet been touched and by making further changes to those amended by Bill 41. All the needed changes can be done at once or, if the task is too great, certain amendments can be made quickly and a general revision of many of the statutes can be done at a more leisurely pace. The changing of a few words here and there can remove problems, but that often leaves other wordings that are no longer necessary and should be amended or removed. There may also be other obscure distinctions that should be amended

I will provide a few examples of provisions that are now invalid and suggest how they can be repaired. Officials of the Department of Justice are aware of most of the problematic provisions, as they identified them for us, and legislative counsel can easily make the necessary amendments. I will later propose some additional changes that were not dealt with in Bill 41, that I believe will strengthen and improve the statutes. The following suggestion deals only with amendments that should be made immediately.

Issue No. 4

Bill 41, passed by the Manitoba government in 2001 was intended to extend the rights of married couples to common-law partners. The Bill resulted in the amendment of the Civil Service Superannuation Act, Court of Queen's Bench Act, Dependants Relief Act, Family Maintenance Act, Fatal Accidents Act, Legislative Assembly Act, Pension Benefits Act, Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, Teachers' Pensions Act and the Workers Compensation Act.

Using the Workers Compensation Act as an example, before Bill 41 was passed, section 1 provided:

Bill 41 amendments added a definition of common-law partner and altered but retained the distinctions contained in the former section. Section 1, in part, now provides:

The result is that while one problem was cured - treating married and common-law partners in a somewhat similar manner - the new provisions are still discriminatory in several respects.

1. There is a waiting period for an employee living common-law while there is no waiting period for a married person.
2. There is discrimination between common-law couples on the basis of whether they have a child.
3. The child that is referred to in the definition must be a child of the couple. This excludes a common-law couple where the child they are raising is the child of one of the partners from a previous relationship.

During our consultations, several people referred to these distinctions. Some said the difference could be removed if common-law partnerships could be registered. If that were possible, they suggested, common-law couples could be treated in the same way as married people and no waiting period would be necessary. Apart from that suggestion, there were no arguments advanced that the provisions might be unconstitutional. The closest remark of that nature I can recall was, I think made by the Chairperson of the Manitoba Human Rights Commission. Her remark was: "I guess the distinction is justified."

It appears to me that the legal community, faced with so many other issues dealing with same-sex relationships, has not yet turned its collective mind to this issue. In my opinion the distinctions are not justified, but I do not want to be too positive on the point as I haven't had the opportunity to debate it with counsel, which was my practice on the bench when an issue of this significance arose. The issue was not pressed during our meetings but at that time I had not completed my examination of the Supreme Court decisions. I would have liked to discuss this issue with the lawyers in the constitutional law branch of the Department of Justice, but did not think that was appropriate as the terms of reference ask for my own opinion.

The issue may have been addressed by those who drafted the amendments that appeared in Bill 41. I do not know that either. I mention these caveats on my opinion, but trust that the issues I raise will receive careful scrutiny by those within the department who are dealing with these issues on a regular basis.

The question to be asked, having in mind the comments of the Supreme Court, is how the presence or absence of a child affects the provision of a disability or employment benefit and how the distinction between married and unmarried partners can be justified.

In the course of her discussion in Miron v. Trudel, McLachlin J, quoting from Boronovsky v. Chief Rabbis of Isreal. stressed that:

The goal of the legislation in question must be examined to see that all people are treated equally and that there are no real differences amongst them that are relevant to that goal.

She went on to say that:

Discrimination on the basis of marital status touches the essential dignity and worth of the individual. --- The disadvantages inflicted on the unmarried partner have ranged from social ostracism through denial of status and benefits.

Among her subsequent comments, was the following:

If the evil to which s. 15(1) is addressed is the violation of human dignity and freedom by imposing limitations or disadvantages on the basis of the stereotypical application of presumed group characteristics, rather than on the basis of individual capacity, worth or circumstance, then marital status should be considered an analogous ground.

In Law v. Canada, Iacobucci J. said:

I emphasize, then, that any demonstration by a claimant that a legislative provision or other state action has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable, or less worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society (whether or not it involves a demonstration that the provision or other state action corroborates or exacerbates an existing prejudicial stereotype), will suffice to establish an infringement of s. 15(1).

My personal opinion is that the differentiation made between those who have cohabited for three years, without a child, and those who have cohabited for one year with a child would be upset in a Charter challenge. The federal and some provincial legislation avoids any distinction based on the presence of a child by having the rights of all common-law partners commence after cohabitation for one or two years. That still does not address the different treatment of common-law and married people. To be acceptable, the legislation should state that the benefits are available to a "spouse" and a "common-law partner" without providing any waiting period unless it applies to both.

The limitations of one or three years appear to be based on the stereotypical assumption that a common-law partnership is not as stable as a marriage. The waiting periods appear to have been included so someone can see if the common-law partnership is stable.

That limitation and distinction has absolutely nothing to do with the purpose of the Act, which is to provide certain employee benefits. I can see that some proof of the existence of any type of relationship that gives rise to benefits might be required. A program administrator might require a copy of a marriage certificate from those who claim to be married, a copy of a certificate that a common-law partnership has been registered (if such a system existed), or some other proof that a common-law relationship actually exists.

Tying entitlements to having a child is also unreasonable and discriminatory. It is of course impossible for same-sex couples to have a child between them so the requirement further discriminates against that type of common-law partnership. Again I assume the presence of a child in a partnership is supposed to be an indicator of stability. I don't know if that is the case or not but, to take the matter further, I ask what other legislation discriminates against a woman or a couple who do or do not have a child?

The effect of the present wording also eliminates from the definition a person who is living in a heterosexual common-law relationship where one of the partners is already married. Those living in that sort of relationship cannot be ignored. While there may be problems in sorting out entitlements between a spouse and a common-law partner, that is no reason to exclude the couple from benefits received by married partners or other common-law partners.

In fairness to those who drafted Bill 41 I appreciate the limitations of which I have spoken were included in previous legislation and the possible impact of the Charter upon them may not have been considered, or my concern may have been considered and dismissed.

In my opinion the terms of entitlement to benefits under all Acts must now be the same for everyone. Proof of the existence of a relationship is an entirely different matter. The government administrators can demand whatever proof they require.

Issue No. 5

There are other obscure provisions in statutes that will have to be amended to make certain that married and common-law relationships are treated in the same way. The one I will refer to caught my attention when I was writing on the previous issue. The problem with the provisions is that they appear in the middle of a section and is not as readily apparent as those involving the use of terms such as "spouse" or "common-law partner." I suggest government ask its legislative counsel and others familiar with specific Acts to examine them with the concept of equality of treatment in mind and ask them to propose amendments to remove any distinctions.

Section 3(1) of The Civil Service Superannuation Act, provides that surviving common-law partners are entitled to certain benefits, but 3(2) provides that if the board has not received written notice of a common-law relationship, and it pays out an amount under the Act, it is not liable for not making the payment to a common-law partner.

The section could well be challenged under the Charter as it appears to treat those in a common-law relationship in a different manner than those who are married. There is apparently no avenue of escape for the board if it fails to pay an amount that is due to a married person. As the section reads at the moment, it applies an additional obligation on a common-law employee.

If the word of an employee that he or she is married is all that is required, the same should apply to common-law partners. If a certificate of marriage or registration or some other proof is required of one relationship it should also be required of the other. Those matters are administrative in nature and should not be reflected in a statute, at least if they differentiate between employees.

It appears to me, instead of placing an additional onus on employees to report their living arrangements to it, the Board should have access to and rely on the human resource records that are kept by each department and centrally as well. It should of course be up to each employee to keep those records current and to indicate a change such as marriage, entry into a common-law partnership or the death of a beneficiary, if any of those events occur, and are reported to the employer, I cannot understand why there should be a responsibility to report changes to the Board as well.

My inquiries reveal that on becoming employed by the provincial government an employee must indicate whether he or she is single, married or living common-law and declare the date the relationship commenced. It is the responsibility of each employee to keep his or her statistics up-to-date. Presumably if a person does not wish to disclose the existence of a marriage or common-law partnership, he or she would not expect any benefits for a partner. It seems odd they now have to advise the board separately and it is possible, if that exists, they may have to advise other boards or offices as well.

Issue No. 6

The rights of a child of common-law partners, or of one of the partners, including any child being cared for and raised by them, requires special attention.

I recommend all Manitoba legislation be examined and amended where necessary to ensure that all children receive the same support and succession benefits from their care-givers as do children of married parents. I recognize that adoption will permit children to obtain all the rights of a natural child but not all common-law partners adopt their children and those who are still married to another person cannot adopt.

A child is in a difficult position when its natural parent is living in a common-law relationship with someone who is still married to another. The law cannot force people to divorce, nor can it or should it force people who are living common-law to marry. The situation is different when looked at from the position of a child. To ask a question based on the discussion and declarations of the judges of the Supreme Court, why should all children not be entitled to receive the same benefits from their care-givers whether they are married, single, or common-law partners?

One option would be to permit common-law couples, where one is still married to someone else, to register a common-law partnership to confirm and record their present situation. Some may not want to do that, any more than they want to marry. For those that are caring for and raising children, it might be possible to include a statutory provision that, for the purposes of a particular Act, they be "deemed to be in a common-law relationship". That would provide their children with additional rights and the care-giver's choice could not diminish the rights of the children.

Children, like adults, are entitled to rely on the protection of s. 15(1) of the Charter. It would be a considerable task to examine all the legislation that deals with, or could deal with the rights of children in particular situations and I have not attempted to do that. The constitutional question alone, as it applies to the rights of children as individuals, will require careful consideration. All I wish to do is raise the issue for those dealing with property statutes on a regular basis to consider. I will nevertheless express my concerns and the changes I think, subject to further study, would likely be required.

The issue of protecting children being raised and cared for by common-law couples is of particular importance in Manitoba which has only recently recovered from the decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Carignan v. Carignan 22 R.F.L. (3d) 376 that permitted a man who had been living in common-law with a woman and her two children, to renounce the responsibility he previously had for the child who had been born to the woman before the common-law relationship began. Although the man had been in loco parentis to the child, that is, he was in the position of a parent to the child, the court's decision permitted him (and of course others in a similar position) to renounce that designation and responsibility. The decision was not appealed to the Supreme Court and remained in force in Manitoba between November 1989 and January 1999.

In the more recent Manitoba case of Chartier v. Chartier [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242, 43 R.F.L. (4^th) 1, that I referred to when discussing adoption, the trial judge and the Manitoba Court of Appeal again relied on the in loco parentis principle and the decision in Carignan. The Supreme Court decision in Chartier in effect overturned the Carignan decision and confirmed the position taken by other western provinces, including that of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Theriault v. Theriault (1984), 149 A.R. 210 (Alta. C.A.), which held that a person who stands in the place of a parent cannot unilaterally withdraw from that relationship.

I mention the Reports of Family Law citation as it includes an editorial annotation by James S. McLeod, a recognized expert in family law. He said, during a lengthy review of the case, it "puts to rest the long-running dispute about whether a person who assumes a parental role to a partner's child can abandon that role by canceling his or her relationship with the child. The Supreme Court clearly rejected the right of a person who had accepted parental responsibilities to withdraw them.

In Chartier it had been agreed that the rights and obligations under The Family Maintenance Act and the Divorce Act were identical for the purposes of the court action and appeal. In addition to the quotes that I refer to at pages 20 in Part I of this report, Bastarache J., said, at page 20 of the R.F.L. report,

Once a person is found to stand in the place of a parent, that relationship cannot be unilaterally withdrawn by the adult---the provisions of the Divorce Act that deal with children aim to ensure that a divorce will affect the children as little as possible. Spouses are entitled to divorce each other, but not the children who were part of the marriage. The interpretation that will best serve children is one that recognizes that when people act as parents toward them, the children can count on that relationship continuing and that these persons will continue to act as parents toward them.

At page 21 he added,

Until Mr. Chartier's unilateral withdraw from the relationship, Jessica saw the respondent as her father in every way. He was the only father she knew. To allow him to withdraw from that relationship, as long as he does it before the petition for divorce, is unacceptable. The breakdown of the parent/child relationship after separation is not a relevant factor in determining whether or not a person stands in the place of a parent for the purposes of the Divorce Act. Jessica was as much part of the family unit as Jeena and should not be treated differently from her because the spouses separated.

At page 22 of the R.F.L. report Bastarache J. made a statement that is particularly apt to this discussion.

Whether a person stands in the place of a parent must take into account all factors relevant to that determination, viewed objectively. What must be determined is the nature of the relationship. The Divorce Act makes no mention of formal expressions of intent. The focus on voluntariness and intention in Carignan, supra, was dependent on the common law approach discussed earlier. It was wrong. The Court must determine the nature of the relationship by looking at a number of factors, among which is intention. Intention will not only be expressed formally. The court must also infer intention form actions, and take into consideration that even expressed intentions may sometimes change. The actual fact of forming a new family is a key factor in drawing an inference that the step-parent treats the child as a member of his or her family, i.e., a child of the marriage. The relevant factors in defining the parental relationship include, but are not limited to, whether the child participates in the extended family in the same way as would a biological child; whether the person provides financially for the child (depending on ability to pay); whether the person disciplines the child as a parent; whether the person represents to the child, the family the world, either explicitly or implicitly, that he or she is responsible as a parent to the child; the nature or existence of the child's relationship with the absent biological parent. The manifestation of the intention of the step-parent cannot be qualified as to duration, or be otherwise made conditional or qualified, even if this intention is manifested expressly. Once it is shown that the child is to be considered, in fact, a "child of the marriage", the obligations of the step-parent, at this point, does not only incur obligations. He or she also acquires certain rights, such as the right to apply eventually for custody or access under s. 16(1) of the Divorce Act.

Referring to some of the concerns of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, Bastarache, J., also said,

Huband J.A., in Carignan, supra, also expressed the concern that a child might collect support from both the biological parent and the step-parent. I do not accept that this is a valid concern. The contribution to be paid by the biological parent should be assessed independently of the obligations of the step-parent. The obligation to support a child arises as soon as that child is determined to be "a child of the marriage". The obligations of parents for a child are all joint and several. The issue of contribution is one between all of the parents who have obligations towards the child, whether they are biological parents or step-parents; it should not affect the child. If a parent seeks contribution from another parent, he or she must, in the meantime pay support for the child regardless of the obligations of the other parent.

The Supreme Court concluded its decision by saying,

The respondent's unilateral withdrawal from the relationship with Jessica does not change the fact that he acted, in all ways, as a father during the time the family lived together. Therefore, Jessica was a "child of the marriage" when the parties separated and later divorced, with all of the rights and responsibilities which that status entails under the Divorce Act. With respect to support from the respondent, Jessica is to be treated in the same way as Jeena.

This case has changed the law in Manitoba but is equally important as an indication of the care that must be taken when amending and defining rights in legislative enactments. Chartier and Theriault discuss the use of the term in loco parentis and raise a question about its applicability today. I suggest that Manitoba discontinue its use, as has the Divorce Act, and use the term "stands in the place of a parent" used in the Divorce Act or what I consider to be the even better term alluded by Bastarache J. "has acted like a parent toward a child". Legislation should clearly indicate the extent of the responsibility of parents and of common-law partners towards the children in their care.

The Manitoba legislature could have amended its legislation when Carignan was initially released if it did not accord with the intent of the legislature. This is a good example of the division of powers in Canada and the responsibilities of courts and of parliament and legislatures. The court's task is to interpret and apply the law and the responsibility of the legislature is to make law. When a legislature disagrees with a decision of a court it has the ultimate authority to amend the law to correct any harm the courts have uncovered.

I recommend all Manitoba statutes that provide a child with rights and benefits on the separation or death of their natural parents be amended to extend the same rights to children who have been or are being raised by a common-law couple. If the same rights are not made available to all children, it is possible a successful Charter challenge could be launched on behalf of a child by a common-law parent or by the Public Trustee. If this change is adopted by government it may not be necessary to use the "deeming" provision I suggested earlier.

The question of determining whether a person stands or has stood in the place of a parent to a child depends on the circumstances and Bastarache J. gave some examples. It is possible if a child is in his or her later teens and is living independently or answers only to the natural parent the other might not fit the category, but in most cases where young children are being raised I would expect that common-law parents act toward them in the same manner they would a natural child.

Issue No. 7

Many statutes do not define all the terms that are referred to in them. A "term" is any word that may be interpreted in a number of ways or can have more than one meaning. When a person comes across a term when reading or studying a statute, he or she should be able to look in the definition section to see the sense in which the word is used and to determine the extent of its meaning.

It may be necessary on occasion to give a word or term different meanings in different statutes but that should be avoided if possible. If a person refers to a statute and sees that the word is defined in a certain way, it would be a reasonable assumption that it is defined the same way in other statutes. If it is not, some confusion among those not intimately familiar with all the statutes is quite likely to arise.

An example of a term that appears in many statutes, but is not usually defined, is "family." Without going through all the statutes again, it is my recollection that the City of Winnipeg Act uses the term only once when dealing with conflict of interest. When I saw the term I looked for its definition but failed to find one. That is such a voluminous Act I may have missed other references to the term and might have missed a definition that appears with reference to only certain provisions. That aside, I should have been able to find out what relatives were intended to be included in the term "family."

In the Adoption Act " family" means:

a "child's parents, step-parents, siblings, grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, any person in loco parentis to the child and the spouse of any of those persons." A minimal correction that will protect the provision from a Charter attack would be to add "common-law partner" after "spouse."

Rather than using all the plurals, I suggest that a clearer wording be developed. A more neutral definition might be:

"family" includes a person's spouse, common-law partner, child, parent, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, cousin, and grandparent.

Another term I suggest be defined in all statutes where the term is used, is "spouse." It is used a great deal but it is presently not defined. Some statutes now provide rights formerly enjoyed by spouses to common-law couples as well. If the present wordings prevail a statute may say that the word "spouse when referred to in this section" means or includes --- but that still does not define the basic term.

In addition to clarifying exactly what the term means, government might want to include a definition of the term "spouse" to address the concern of those who feel that the institution of marriage is being diminished or is losing its identity. I have no legislative definition to follow but suggest that something like the following might be appropriate.

"spouse" means the partner of a man or a woman who are married to each other.

Immediately after a spouse is defined each statute should, as I have indicated a number of times, include a definition of a "common-law partner" and "common-law partnership." My suggestions are,

"common-law partner" means a person who is living with another in a conjugal relationship.

"common-law partnership" means two persons who are living together in a conjugal relationship.

I think, although it is difficult to define "conjugal relationship" in a few words, it might be well to define it even though the Supreme Court explanation of the term in Maldowich would be difficult to reduce to a few words. Although a better one can likely be developed, the following might suffice:

"conjugal relationship" means two people who live together in a personal or marriage-like relationship.

The term "dependant" often appears in the middle of a statute and only applies to certain sections. If it is possible to do so I suggest its definition appear in Section 1 and apply to the whole Act. It is also my recollection that the term is not defined in the same way in every Act.

As the issue was raised by a number of people with whom we spoke, government might also wish to examine the term "nearest relative" that is used in some health related statutes to make sure a common-law partner has the authority to provide a consent.

As I conclude this Part on property I would like to emphasize again if changes in legislation are being made, and they have to be, they should treat all individuals the same. Amendments must remove any hint of stereotypical distinctions between individuals and between different forms of personal relationships.

Opinion on Common-Law Relationships of Hon. A.C Hamilton, Q.C. - Final Report Part III) Property - Advice and Recommendations
Part III) Case Law	Part IV) Introduction
Opinion on Common-Law Relationships of Jennifer A. Cooper, Q.C. Volume 1 Volume 2 (proposed Statute Amendments) Opinion on Common-Law Relationships of Hon. A.C Hamilton, Q.C. Final Report