Madam Speaker: I have a ruling for the House.
I am ruling on a matter of privilege raised on June 23 by the honourable member for St. Johns (Mr. Mackintosh). The matter of privilege arose from answers to questions posed in the House on June 19. In putting forward his case, the honourable member for St. Johns asserted that contrary to a government election promise made that people who solicit sex from prostitutes would have their vehicles seized, the legislation, when it was brought forward in the shape of Bill 38, did not provide for the forfeiture of johns' vehicles. When the member for St. Johns posed a question on June 19 to the Minister of Justice (Mr. Toews) about whether vehicles would be confiscated, the minister replied that the bill would allow a motor vehicle to be seized, but there would be some intermediary steps that the police thought would be more effective in dealing with this particular problem. The honourable member for St. Johns concluded that the minister had deliberately misled the House to try and make it believe that the government response to prostitution was in accord with the election promise.
The government House leader in his submission on the matter of privilege raised a concern about timeliness, as the bill in question had been moved for second reading on June 5, and referenced Beauchesne Citation 115 which states: "a question of privilege must be brought to the attention of the House at the first possible opportunity. Even a gap of a few days may invalidate the claim for precedence in the House." In speaking to the matter of privilege, the Minister of Justice asserted that the legislation did have repercussions for johns which in various circumstances do lead to the seizure of motor vehicles.
A Speaker when considering a matter of privilege must be satisfied that the matter was raised at the earliest opportunity and that a prima facie case exists, or, as expressed by Joseph Maingot, the Canadian authority, is the evidence on its face sufficiently strong for the House to be asked to send it to a committee to investigate whether the privileges of the House have been breached.
Speaker Walding on June 13, 1985, in ruling on a matter of privilege said: "The deliberate misleading of the House by a member is a serious matter and probably constitutes a breach of privilege. It must be borne in mind, however, that a deliberate misleading of the House involves an intent to mislead and/or knowledge that the statement would mislead." Speaker Rocan on January 17, 1990, quoted Speaker Phillips who ruled that when one member "charges another member has deliberately misled the House, that member must support his or her charge with proof of intent."
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I believe the Manitoba rulings are based on an extract from Maingot's book Parliamentary Privilege in Canada, Second Edition, on page 234, where he states that an admission that either a member of the House was intentionally misled or an admission of facts that lead naturally to the conclusion that a member was intentionally misled, and a direct relationship between the misleading information and a proceeding in Parliament would be necessary to establish a prima facie case of a matter of privilege.
I am concerned that there was some delay between the time the bill in question was moved for first reading, distributed and moved for second reading and the date on which the honourable member for St. Johns raised his case. However, as the honourable member for St. Johns noted, he had asked a question to clarify the matter respecting seizure of vehicles on Thursday, June 19, and raised the matter of privilege on June 23, which perhaps was the first opportunity he had after receiving the printed Hansard of June 19.
To make a case that a member deliberately misled the House is very difficult, because as noted earlier in this ruling, the member in question must admit to doing so or else his or her intent to mislead must be proved. Further, obstruction of the House or of a member by the alleged misleading must be proved. I find that the honourable member for St. Johns has not made a case of the Minister of Justice (Mr. Toews) deliberately, with intent, misleading this House. And I also do not believe it has been shown that the member for St. Johns or the members of the House were obstructed in their work by the actions of the Minister of Justice. Because a prima facie case has not been made, I must rule the motion of the honourable member for St. Johns to be out of order.
It appears what does exist are two opinions: The honourable member for St. Johns was certain that the legislation would not lead to the forfeiture of vehicles, while the Minister of Justice stated the law could lead to the seizure of johns' motor vehicles.